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Abstract
This paper discusses the issue of central bank losses, developing a framework for assess-
ing the ability of a central bank to keep its balance sheet sustainable without having to de-
fault on its policy objectives. Compared to the earlier literature, it analyses in more depth
the consequences of economic convergence for the evolution of the central bank’s balance
sheet and the important role played in this process by the risk premium and equilibrium
real exchange rate appreciation. A combination of a closed-form comparative-static ana-
lysis and numerical solutions of the future evolution of the central bank’s own capital is
used. Applying the framework to the Czech National Bank’s case, the paper concludes
that the CNB should be able to repay its accumulated loss in about 15 years without any
transfer from public budgets.
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Nontechnical Summary
The motivation of this paper was the observation of systematic losses incurred by central banks
of relatively low-inﬂation economies converging towards the developed world. Central bank
losses and negative capital have become an important issue of policy debate, reﬂecting the
experience of numerous central banks across the world. This issue is highly relevant to the
CNB, because of the large accumulated loss in its balance sheet.
We analyse the economic sources of the central bank’s losses while abstracting from the poten-
tial ﬁscal or quasi-ﬁscal reasons. In a consistent framework we discuss what real GDP growth,
price level convergence, the risk premium and its trend decline, and disinﬂation mean for the
central bank’s balance sheet. We present a closed-form comparative-static analysis as well as
numerical projections of the central bank’s own capital. To do so, we link the balance-sheet
model with the CNB’s macroeconomic forecast published in its Inﬂation reports. Such an ap-
proach has not been used in earlier papers. Also, in comparison with earlier literature the
present analysis is more in-depth as regards the consequences of economic convergence and
the role played by the risk premium and equilibrium real exchange rate appreciation for central
bank ﬁnancial performance.
Our framework can be used for assessing the sustainability of the central bank’s ﬁnances. In
the Czech National Bank’s case, we conclude that the CNB should be able to repay its accu-
mulated loss without transfers from public budgets. This is important, because any government
participation in central bank ﬁnancing could constrain the bank’s operational independence. In
addition, we describe the historical experience of the CNB and compare the historical simula-
tions based on our model with the actual history of the CNB’s balance sheet.
While the CNB’s case has many speciﬁc features and the conclusions reached in our paper may
not be directly transferable to other central banks, the derived framework itself is fairly general
and could be successfully applied to other countries’ experience.
In a separate section of the article, we elaborate on the consequences of potential EMU mem-
bership for the entering bank’s balance sheet. We separately discuss both the economic and
institutional aspects. As regard the economic side, it is possible to amend our model using the
restrictions on exchange rates, interest rates and the risk premium implied by EMU member-
ship. On the other hand, the balance sheets of the participating National Central Banks are
affected by ESCB monetary income redistribution rules. Overall for the CNB, the effect of euro
adoption seems to be ambiguous. While the economic factors would imply faster repayment of
the CNB’s accumulated loss, the institutional factors are likely to push in the other direction.
The actual outcome may depend on many assumptions, including the development of moneti-
sation both in the Czech Republic and in the euro area, the number of countries in the euro area,
etc. Some of the simulations that we carried out suggested that euro adoption would on balance
speed up the repayment of the CNB’s loss marginally, by about 2 years. Moreover, because of
the elimination of the exchange rate risk the repayment would be more certain. We do not make
any normative conclusions, however, because the better prospects for the CNB’s loss repayment
in the euro area partly stems from higher inﬂation.Central Bank Losses and Economic Convergence 3
1. Introduction
While under standard circumstances a central bank should operate at a proﬁt, numerous central
banks have faced substantial losses that have deteriorated their balance sheets and led to an
accumulation of negative capital over recent decades. This has naturally raised the issue of
whether a central bank can successfully conduct its monetary policy even with a negative level
of its own capital.
This issue is highly relevant to the Czech National Bank (CNB), too, as it has incurred consid-
erable losses since 2000, and it is currently operating with substantially negative own capital.
At the end of 2007, its accumulated loss stood at CZK 200 bn., which is equivalent to 57% of
the currency in circulation, or 6.7% of nominal GDP. Its negative own capital was only slightly
lower, at CZK 176 bn.
The aim of this paper is to provide a practical framework for assessing the ability of a central
banktokeepitsbalancesheetsustainablewithouthavingtodefaultonitspolicyobjectivesgiven
the current level of its own capital and the economic prospects. It builds on Holub (2001b),
Bindseil, ManzanaresandWeill(2004), andIze(2005). Whilethebasicrulesthatgoverncentral
bank ﬁnancing are derived in those articles, the present paper avoids some simpliﬁcations of the
central bank’s balance sheet and the short cuts used in the macroeconomic context that may
constrain the use of those earlier papers for practical analyses of a central bank’s own capital.
In particular, the present paper discusses in more detail the consequences of economic conver-
gence for the evolution of the central bank’s balance sheet. Economic convergence typically
includes some combination of GDP catch-up from an initially low level along with price level
convergence, which means real exchange rate appreciation, a high – but gradually decreasing –
risk premium on domestic assets, some progress with disinﬂation, relatively fast growth of cur-
rency in circulation supported by fast GDP growth and increasing monetisation of the economy,
etc. All these factors have implications for the central bank’s ﬁnancial performance, but the
present paper stresses above all the important role played by the risk premium and equilibrium
real exchange rate appreciation. It also provides both a closed-form comparative-static analy-
sis and numerical solutions of the future evolution of the central bank’s own capital, exploiting
some complementarities of the two approaches which have not been combined in earlier papers.
The paper applies the derived framework to the example of the CNB. We show that under most
plausible scenarios the CNB will be able to repay its current losses at the horizon of approx-
imately 15 years out of its future proﬁts. While the CNB’s case has many speciﬁc features,
the framework itself is fairly general, and we thus believe it could be successfully applied to
other countries’ experience, too. We also show that our model was able to account well for the
historical development of the CNB’s actual balance sheet.
The rest of this text is organised as follows. Section 2 elaborates on the existing literature
regarding central bank ﬁnancing and discusses the extensions that are made in this paper. In
section 3, we build a comprehensive model of a central bank’s balance sheet, discuss the conse-
quences of economic convergence and derive basic rules for the evolution of the central bank’s
own capital ratio. Section 4 is devoted to the speciﬁc case of the CNB. It describes the historical
experience of the CNB and it compares the historical simulations based on our model with the
actual history of the CNB’s balance sheet. Furthermore, we attempt to ﬁnd out how the CNB’s
own capital may evolve in the future. To do so, we link the balance-sheet model with the CNB’s
macroeconomic forecast published in its inﬂation reports. Then, in section 5, we elaborate on4 Martin Cincibuch, Tom´ aˇ s Holub, Jarom´ ır Hurn´ ık
the consequences of potential EMU membership for the entering bank’s balance sheet. Finally,
section 6 concludes.
2. Existing Literature and New Developments
This section provides some references which may be useful for understanding the relationship
of the present paper to earlier work. It does not, however, set out to provide a comprehen-
sive summary of the existing literature on central bank capital, as this can be easily found, for
example, in Bindseil, Manzanares and Weill (2004).
The economic literature has long discussed the potential sources of central bank losses and
corresponding remedies. A classical reference as regards the quasi-ﬁscal origins of the losses is
Fry (1993). Quasi-ﬁscal operations were also explored in Mackenzie and Stella (1996). Stella
(1997) and Dalton and Dziobek (1999) concentrated on describing some particular cases and
their particular solution, mainly by central bank re-capitalisation. Central bank quasi-ﬁscal
operations in the case of transition economies were discussed, for example, in Markiewicz
(2001).
Recently, the literature has started to focus more on the losses related to the high and grow-
ing foreign exchange reserves in many countries. Holub (2001a) decomposed central banks’
proﬁts/losses into seigniorage (monetary income), the costs associated with holding net foreign
exchange assets, quasi-ﬁscal operations and operating costs, and applied this decomposition
to the CNB’s case. He concluded that the opportunity costs associated with foreign exchange
reserves consumed about two thirds of the CNB’s monetary income between 1993 and 1999.
Hawkins (2003) mentioned sterilised foreign exchange interventions as a special case of quasi-
ﬁscal activities by central banks that could lead to losses. Higgins and Klitgaard (2004) dis-
cussed the costs and risks of accumulating reserves, focusing mainly on Asian central banks.
Exchange rate losses were also discussed in Frait (2005), Stella and L¨ onnberg (2008), and for
some particular countries in Stella (2008).1
An important stream of literature has analysed the net present value of central banks (see Fry,
1993; Stella, 1997; Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe, 1999), thus de-emphasising their current proﬁts
and own capital and highlighting intertemporal solvency. A positive net present value in fact
means that the central bank will generate sufﬁcient proﬁts from seigniorage in the future to
repay current losses, and the negative own capital at present does not mean a solvency problem.
Cincibuch and V´ avra (2001) applied this concept to a transition economy, in particular to the
Czech Republic, and concluded that the net present value of the CNB’s monetary income was
between CZK 360 bn. and 1800 bn. (i.e. between 16% and 82% of annual GDP in the year
2000), depending on the macroeconomic scenario chosen for the calculation.
While the net present value approach is theoretically appealing, it is too far from the actual
accounting practices of central banks and does not explicitly analyse the development of their
own capital over time. It also ignores the possible policy implications and credibility issues
arising from the negative own capital of a central bank if there is no prospect of repayment in
the foreseeable future. Stella (1997) discussed the need for central bank capital and articulated
the possibility of inﬂation control being abandoned in reaction to the worsening of a central
bank’s balance sheet.2 Holub (2001b) also dealt with the link between the evolution of a central
bank’s capital and its ability to perform its policy goals, analysing the sustainability of the
1 See also The Economist (2005) for a popular discussion of these issues.
2 More recent contributions include Stella (2005) and Stella (2008).Central Bank Losses and Economic Convergence 5
central bank’s ﬁnancial situation. Sims (2003) analysed some scenarios under which a central
bank might lose control of inﬂation, and argued that the presence of such scenarios legitimises
attention to the balance sheet by a central bank that does not have reliable ﬁscal backing. Stella
and L¨ onnberg (2008) used the term “policy insolvency” to describe situations in which a central
bank’s policy decisions are affected by its ﬁnancial condition.
Bindseil, Manzanares and Weill (2004) developed a model of central bank ﬁnancing based on
the evolution of a central bank’s balance sheet in a basic macroeconomic context. Similarly, Ize
(2005) sets a formal framework for the calculation of the minimum level of central bank capital
needed to ensure the credibility of a central bank’s inﬂation target. Frait (2005) discussed
the consequences of negative central bank capital using the particular example of the CNB,
concluding that its negative capital has so far not damaged monetary policy credibility in the
Czech Republic and that it can be offset by future CNB proﬁts.
In the present paper, we sum up the conclusions of Holub (2001b), Bindseil, Manzanares and
Weill (2004) and Ize (2005) and use them to build up a more advanced framework for the
modelling of the central bank balance sheet. We thus describe the approaches of these three
papers in more detail here.
Bindseil, Manzanares and Weill (2004) pointed out that the connection between the level of
a central bank’s capital, its credibility and the possibility of abandonment of inﬂation control
had not been well argued and formalised in the earlier literature. To overcome this problem
they introduced a formal framework consisting of a simpliﬁed central bank balance sheet and
a simple macroeconomic model based on the Wicksellian relationship between inﬂation and
interest rates. The connection between the credibility of the central bank (i.e. its control over
inﬂation) and its ﬁnancing goes via the public’s trust in the worth of money. It is argued that
a loss-making central bank is simply not believed to ignore its balance sheet while conducting
monetary policy. The danger of a deﬂationary trap is used as an example where the central bank
may inﬂate deliberately. In addition, Bindseil, Manzanares and Weill (2004) argue that after a
period of protracted losses, private perceptions of the risk of the central bank losing the right to
issue legal tender may emerge.
Although the framework of Bindseil, Manzanares and Weill (2004) is theoretically useful, it is
based on some assumptions that may be too strong to be applied for practical simulations. From
a fundamental perspective, a striking constraint may be the assumed stability of the public’s
demand for legal tender. Indeed, it is hard to believe that higher inﬂation caused deliberately
by the central bank to improve its ﬁnancing would not lead to currency substitution and thus
limit the increase in monetary income. From a practical perspective, the balance sheet and the
macroeconomic model seem to be too simple to provide a reliable simulation of a central bank’s
balance sheet given its current state and the likely economic outlook. This holds especially in
the case of an open economy, as Bindseil, Manzanares and Weill (2004) do not work explicitly
with the exchange rate and the risk premium. It will become evident later that the extension of
the analysis to economies with systematic negative pressure on the central bank’s balance sheet,
i.e. economies that face a non-zero risk premium or systematic changes in the real exchange
rate, inﬂuences the results signiﬁcantly.
In contrast with Bindseil, Manzanares and Weill (2004), Holub (2001b) and Ize (2005) in their
analyses do give a prominent role to the risk premium (in combination with the structure of the
central bank’s balance sheet) as a key determinant of central bank proﬁts. They do not, how-
ever, explicitly deal with the role of the real exchange rate trend. Unlike Bindseil, Manzanares
and Weill (2004), they do not provide simulations of central bank capital. Instead, they con-6 Martin Cincibuch, Tom´ aˇ s Holub, Jarom´ ır Hurn´ ık
centrate on the analytical exposition of the evolution of central bank capital over time and its
convergence to steady-state values. In doing so, they highlight the importance of the difference
between the domestic interest rate and the growth rate of currency in circulation, as well as
the level of central bank proﬁts with zero own capital (“core proﬁts” in the terminology of Ize,
2005).
Ize (2005), who formalises the policy implications of the model more explicitly than Holub
(2001b), develops the concept of “core capital”, i.e. the minimum capital needed by a central
bank to ensure the credibility of its inﬂation target. Core capital is a function of the central
bank’s operating expenditures and the carrying cost of its international reserves. Although we
build on this principle, there are simpliﬁcations that we aim to overcome. First, in addition
to core capital, Ize (2005) introduces a variable called “core inﬂation”, which serves as a link
between core capital and the central bank’s credibility. “Core inﬂation” plays the role of a policy
variablethatmaybeadjustedtokeepthecentralbank’scapitalinpositivevalues. Thepossibility
of changes in foreign exchange reserves is not discussed, even though their ratio to currency
in circulation is in fact treated as another policy variable that does not endogenously evolve
over time. Second, similarly to Bindseil, Manzanares and Weill (2004), Ize (2005) assumes
money demand to be stable over time, and even deliberately caused inﬂation does not violate
this relationship. Third, it is assumed that in the long run the relative version of purchasing
power parity holds. Thus, the risk premium is calculated as the difference between domestic
and foreign real interest rates. This simpliﬁcation, however, does not necessarily hold for a
converging economy, where the real exchange rate may follow a trend. Fourth, the case where
real growth of currency holdings exceeds the real interest rate is excluded from the analysis as
unrealistic. Again, this may not hold for a converging economy, where appreciation of the real
exchange rate may cause the real interest rate to fall well below the foreign real interest rate and
the monetisation of the economy may be rising at the same time.
Building on Holub (2001b), Bindseil, Manzanares and Weill (2004) and Ize (2005), we extend
the model in several aspects. First, we introduce a coherent open-economy framework and eco-
nomic convergence issues into the analysis. These bring the links between the real exchange
rate, domestic and foreign real interest rates and the risk premium into the game. Second, we
work explicitly with monetary income, which allows for a structured economic discussion of
all the particular factors that inﬂuence the central bank’s balance sheet. Third, we add the sen-
sitivity of money demand to inﬂation to the analysis. Fourth, we relax the assumption of a
strictly exogenous, policy-determined ratio of foreign exchange reserves to currency in circula-
tion. This is done by splitting the foreign exchange reserves into autonomous and discretionary
parts. The autonomous part depends on the relationship between the return on the reserves
and the growth of currency in circulation, whereas the discretionary part depends on the cen-
tral bank’s decision to make interventions in the foreign exchange market. On the one hand,
this split enables us to work with the foreign exchange reserves ratio as another policy variable
in addition to “core inﬂation”, calculating a policy frontier of “core inﬂation” and foreign ex-
change reserves that must be respected by the central bank. The implication of this extension
is straightforward: the central bank may adjust its proﬁtability not only via inﬂation, but also
via its foreign exchange reserves ratio. On the other hand, the autonomous development of the
reserves ratio allows us to discuss if such an adjustment is achievable over time in a passive
manner, or if it requires some active balance-sheet restructuring actions by the central bank.
All the adjustments mentioned above are made with the intention of providing a realistic model
that can be used for analyses and dynamic simulations of central bank capital given the cur-
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outlook. Knowledge of the future evolution of its own capital is crucial for any central bank
operating in the real world. The simulation results show clearly how the structure of the balance
sheet is going to evolve in the future and whether active adjustment is necessary for its sustain-
ability. They may also help the central bank to adopt a proper public communication strategy
and thus deal with the credibility challenges arising from its negative capital.
3. The Central Bank Balance Sheet in a Converging Country
This section discusses the conditions under which the future stream of gains will save the central
bank from indeﬁnite loss accumulation, and when eventually the central bank’s loss may follow
an explosive path.
We start our exposition with the balance-sheet model that is used later on for simulations. For
a better understanding, however, we develop a detailed analytical framework, too. Both the
balance-sheet model and the analytical framework incorporate important features of an open
economy on a convergence path.
Let us begin with a schematic balance sheet of a central bank decomposed into its local currency
and foreign exchange parts. Obviously, the value of the net foreign exchange assets (denoted
by NFXAt) is always ﬁnanced by the net local currency liabilities (NCLt) and own capital
(OWNt).
Denote the interest-bearing part of net local currency liabilities by NIBLt. This consists of
the reserve accounts of commercial banks with the central bank, the net liability stemming
from open market operations, and the net local currency liabilities vis-` a-vis the government and
clients.
On the other hand, the non-interest-bearing liabilities consist mainly of the currency stock
(M0t). For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the other non-interest-bearing liabilities3
may for practical purposes be subsumed into own capital OWNt.
Consequently, we have the following stylised balance sheet of the central bank.
NFXAt = NCLt + OWNt = NIBLt + M0t + OWNt: (3.1)
This means that the own capital in our deﬁnition is expressed as the difference between the
bank’s net foreign exchange assets and net local currency liabilities.
OWNt = NFXAt ¡ NIBLt ¡ M0t: (3.2)
In order to predict the future path of own capital OWN one needs to make projections of the
three components on the right-hand side of (3.2).
It is worth mentioning that the net foreign exchange assets and net local currency liabilities
in the balance sheet (3.2) are separated, unless the bank carries out foreign exchange opera-
tions on its own account. This separation facilitates the linking of OWNt to a macroeconomic
projection.
3 Depending on the local situation, banks’ reserve accounts may be a part of non-interest-bearing liabilities, which
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3.1 Net Local Currency Liabilities
Unless the central bank buys foreign exchange on its own account in amounts INTt, the net
local currency liabilities in the central bank’s balance sheet can change between two periods
only because of interest paid, operating outlays and dividend payments to the Treasury.
As regards the interest rate, we assume that the main open market operations, banks’ current
accounts and other remunerated claims on the central bank carry the same interest4. Let this
prevailing local short-term interest rate be denoted by it.
Further, we denote by OLt the operating outlays that are necessary to sustain the mere func-
tioning of the central bank, and ﬁnally by DIVt the dividend payments to the Treasury (or
some quasi-ﬁscal operations of the central bank) in the period t. Summing up, one may write a
recursive relation that governs this part of a central bank’s balance sheet
NCLt+1 = NCLt + NIBLtit + OLt + DIVt + INTt (3.3)
At the same time, NCLt consists of net interest-bearing liabilities NIBLt and M0t. The
demand for money links M0t to the volume of transactions in the economy and to the interest
rate, while NIBLt becomes a residual item.
As usual, we approximate the transaction volume by the value of gross domestic product and
we also assume that the demand for money is negatively related to the interest rate. If Pt is the
price level then we write
M0t = mtPtGDPt: (3.4)
where monetisation mt is given by
mt = ce
¡®it: (3.5)
3.2 Net Foreign Exchange Assets
We assume that the international reserves of the central bank are invested in assets denominated
in N different currencies. Let us denote by Qi
t the size of the i-th currency portfolio and by Si
t
the exchange rate of the i-th currency vis-` a-vis the local currency at time t. Therefore, the local
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4 We thus assume away any implicit taxation on the banking sector due to unremunerated required reserves. Note
that the required reserves, which are the bulk component of current accounts, are indeed remunerated at the main
policy interest rate in the Czech Republic. This assumption also rules out any quasi-ﬁscal operations in the form
of preferential loans to the government, banking sector, etc. This is justiﬁed given our focus on foreign exchange
reserves-related losses, but may not be realistic for many countries. A generalisation would be straightforward,
though (see e.g. Holub, 2001a).Central Bank Losses and Economic Convergence 9
The value of the net foreign exchange reserves NFXA is affected by exchange rate changes
and by the reserves’ own return; let the net foreign currency return of the i-th portfolio be Ri
t.

















t + INTt; (3.8)
where INTt indicates the amount of foreign exchange bought by the central bank on its own
account in period t.
Taking into account (3.7) we may easily rewrite (3.8) as a law of motion for the local currency
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t)¡1 is a total net local currency return on the foreign exchange
reserves.
For analytical purposes it is also useful to express these relationships using a hypothetical basket
currency. Let St is the exchange rate of this basket currency vis-` a-vis local currency at time t
and let Qt is the size of the basket currency portfolio. Then we rewrite (3.6) as
NFXAt = StQt; (3.10)
and a relationship analogous to (3.8) can be used to deﬁne the net basket currency return Rt:
NFXAt+1 = St+1Qt + St+1QtRt + INTt: (3.11)
Taking into account (3.9), (3.10) and (3.11), one may algebraically solve for the basket-currency





































Note that the basket currency exchange rate level can be arbitrarily rebased and consequently
the size of the currency portfolio is determined up to the multiplicative constant by (3.6) and
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3.3 The Dynamics of Own Capital
The dynamics of own capital are easily derived by substituting (3.3) and (3.9) into (3.2). It
follows that
OWNt+1 = NFXAt+1 ¡ NCLt+1 (3.14)
= NFXAt (1 + y
¤
t) + INTt ¡ NCLt
¡ NIBLtit ¡ OLt ¡ INTt ¡ DIVt
= OWNt + NFXAty
¤
t ¡ NIBLtit ¡ OLt ¡ DIVt
In words, central bank losses may arise because of large net local currency interest-bearing
liabilities (mainly open market operations to sterilise excess liquidity and current accounts of
banks) that ﬁnance substantial parts of the foreign exchange assets in a situation where the total
yield on foreign exchange assets is lower than the ﬁnancing costs. Obviously, large operating
costs also detract from the proﬁts.
One may note that the variable INTt, representing foreign exchange operations, cancels out
and does not enter directly into the calculation of the central bank’s proﬁtability in equation
3.14. Therefore, one might in theory consider restructuring the balance sheet to diminish the
holdings of foreign exchange assets and repaying the local currency interest-bearing liabilities.
In practice, however, the feasibility of this solution could be limited in the short run because of
the imperfect liquidity of the foreign exchange market and the related undesired consequences
for the exchange rate.5
3.4 Real Appreciation, the Risk Premium and Central Bank Proﬁts
The balance-sheet model derived above sets the stage for a discussion of the relationship be-
tween the convergence process and the emergence of central bank losses. To achieve this, one
needs to invoke two basic equilibrium relationships of international macroeconomics, i.e. the
relative version of purchasing power parity and uncovered interest rate parity.
It is a well-known fact that purchasing power parity does not hold empirically unless one allows
for changes in the real exchange rate caused by the economic convergence process. We log-
differentiate the deﬁnition of the (basket) real exchange rate and get
¢st = ¢qt + ¼t+1 ¡ ¼
¤
t+1; (3.15)
where ¢st represents the change in the nominal exchange rate of the basket currency, ¢qt
the change in the real exchange rate of the basket currency, ¼t+1 domestic inﬂation and ¼¤
t+1
foreign inﬂation. Indeed, for a converging (catching-up) economy, real appreciation (¢qt < 0)
is typically observed.
Similarly, we extend the uncovered interest parity condition to capture the existence of the risk
premium that inevitably surrounds the convergence process of any less developed economy. As
5 One possibility without such undesired consequences is to transfer the “excess” foreign exchange assets to the
government, e.g. into a sovereign wealth fund, in exchange for domestic interest-bearing assets. This option has
indeed been pursued in a few countries. Less ambitious operations aiming at reducing the foreign exchange assets
of central banks have been undertaken in Chile and Mexico. The CNB’s scheme of selling a portion of its earnings
on foreign exchange reserves, which has been in place since 2004, also falls into this category of measures.Central Bank Losses and Economic Convergence 11
the existence of this risk premium is a well-known fact to all market participants it may also be
called the predictable excess return. Equation (3.16) captures it.
't = ¡d ¢st + it ¡ i
¤
t; (3.16)
where 't represents the risk premium (predictable excess return), d ¢st the expected change in
the nominal exchange rate of the basket currency, it the domestic nominal interest rate, and i¤
t
the foreign nominal interest rate.
In what follows we put
d ¢st = ¢st; (3.17)
which amounts to dealing with a perfect-foresight framework.6
The substitution of (3.15) and (3.17) into (3.16) gives for the interest rate
it = 't + i
¤
t + ¢st
= 't + i
¤
t + ¢qt + ¼t+1 ¡ ¼
¤
t+1: (3.18)
For the sake of simplicity in the following text, we identify the money market rate i¤
t with the
foreign portfolio return Rt deﬁned in (3.13). With this simpliﬁcation7, the composite return
derived within (3.9) can be (in a log-differencing approximation) rewritten as
y
¤
t = ¢st + i
¤
t; (3.19)
and further using (3.16) it may be rephrased as
y
¤
t = it ¡ 't: (3.20)
Finally, the following expression for the proﬁt and loss before distribution can be derived using
the law of motion for the central bank’s own capital (3.14), using the relationship (3.20) and the
balance-sheet identity (3.2):
PLt+1 = OWNt+1 ¡ OWNt + DIVt (3.21)
= NFXAt (it ¡ 't) ¡ NIBLtit ¡ OLt
= it(M0t + OWNt) ¡ 'tNFXAt ¡ OLt
This expression decomposes central bank proﬁts into seigniorage (monetary income; itM0t),
earnings on the central bank’s own capital (itOWNt), losses on net foreign exchange assets due
to the risk premium ('tNFXAt) and operating outlays (OLt).





t+1 + ¢qt + 't + ¼t+1)(M0t + OWNt) ¡ 'tNFXAt ¡ OLt;
(3.22)
6 A generalisation allowing for unsystematic errors in exchange rate expectations would be straightforward (see
e.g. Holub, 2001a).
7 Depending on its investment strategy, the central bank may, by taking on term or liquidity risk and appropriating
the ensuing premium, achieve systematically higher returns.12 Martin Cincibuch, Tom´ aˇ s Holub, Jarom´ ır Hurn´ ık
which allows us to clarify the role of the main macroeconomic factors affecting central bank
proﬁtability.
The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of this equation shows the standard result that a central
bank can (if M0t + OWNt > 0) improve its proﬁtability by increasing domestic inﬂation8,
which raises its monetary income. However, the equation also shows that the central bank’s
proﬁt is crucially affected by convergence-related variables in combination with the structure
of the central bank’s balance sheet. Since this is the primary focus of the present paper, let us
elaborate on these issues in more detail.
Provided that M0t + OWNt > 0, this decomposition shows that appreciation of the real ex-
change rate (i.e. ¢qt < 0) reduces central bank proﬁts by decreasing the equilibrium real
interest rate in the domestic economy, and thus the seigniorage and earnings on the central
bank’s own capital.9 Note that this effect takes place even if the central bank holds zero net
foreign exchange assets, i.e. even if there can be no revaluation losses due to an appreciating
nominal exchange rate.
It also implies that the trend real appreciation cannot be the sole source of central bank losses,
as nominal interest rates cannot be negative. By reducing proﬁts, it can nevertheless make the
central bank more vulnerable to losses associated with net foreign exchange assets (or possibly
other sources of loss, such as quasi-ﬁscal operations).
For M0t + OWNt < 0, i.e. in the case where the central bank is liable when it comes to
net interest-bearing claims10, the real appreciation helps, because it reduces the interest rate
which the central bank pays for its net liabilities. However, in this dismal situation, and for
'tNFXAt > 0, it may help only to reduce, not to overturn, the inevitable losses.
Furthermore, equation (3.22) illustrates that the impact of the risk premium enters central bank
proﬁts through two channels. First, by increasing the domestic equilibrium interest rate it in-
creases seigniorage and earnings on the central bank’s own capital, and thus improves proﬁts.
Second, it leads to losses on net foreign exchange assets, thus depressing proﬁts. The overall
impact of the risk premium therefore depends on the sign of (M0t + OWNt ¡ NFXAt), i.e.
whether the size of the central bank’s non-interest-bearing liabilities is smaller or greater than
its net foreign exchange assets. Note that the above expression is equal to ¡NIBLt. Therefore,
if the central bank has net local currency interest-bearing assets, the risk premium improves its
proﬁts. On the other hand, if the central bank has net local currency interest-bearing liabilities,
the risk premium may lead to central bank losses. This is true especially if the net foreign ex-
change assets exceed currency in circulation and the central bank’s own capital substantially,
necessitating massive sterilisation of the liquidity issued.
3.5 Capital Ratio Dynamics
For a better understanding of the loss dynamics in relation to currency in circulation we derive a
detailed analytical exposition, which can be used for a comparative-static discussion of a central
bank’s ﬁnancial sustainability. We start with equation (3.14), which, using (3.2) and (3.20), can
8 This is, of course, true only up to the point at which the increasing inﬂation leads to demonetisation of the
economy strong enough to outweigh the positive direct effect. Holub (2001b) also discusses that this may actually
not be true if a higher inﬂation rate increases the risk premium.
9 There may be a partly offsetting effect of increased monetisation resulting from the lower opportunity costs of
holding the domestic currency. This is, however, unlikely to fully compensate for the direct effect for countries
with low inﬂation rates.
10 Recall that M0t + OWNt = NFXAt ¡ NIBLt.Central Bank Losses and Economic Convergence 13
be equivalently expressed as
OWNt+1 = (1 + it)OWNt + itM0t ¡ 'tNFXAt ¡ OLt ¡ DIVt (3.23)
Expressing central bank capital as a ratio to the currency stock, which properly reﬂects its









itM0t ¡ 'tNFXAt ¡ OLt ¡ DIVt
(1 + ¹t)M0t
(3.24)
where ¹t is the growth rate of currency in circulation. Assuming that the dividend to the gov-
ernment is non-negative, i.e. that the central bank receives no capital injections from the gov-









itM0t ¡ 'tNFXAt ¡ OLt
(1 + ¹t)M0t
: (3.25)
Note that this expression is analogous to the government debt equation when expressed as a
ratio to GDP. The second term on the right-hand side is central bank proﬁt if the central bank
haszeroowncapital, whichisanalogoustotheprimarysurplusofpublicbudgets. FollowingIze
(2005), we will call this expression core proﬁts11. The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side reﬂects
the dynamics of the ratio of capital to currency, which crucially depends on the relationship
between the interest rate and currency growth, by analogy with the relationship of the interest
rate and economic growth for the public debt-to-GDP ratio.
To assess whether the ﬁnancial situation of a central bank is sustainable or not, one must eval-
uate inequality (3.25) for the given exogenous parameters and central bank policy goals. The
policy goals naturally include the inﬂation rate (target), which also has implications for nominal
currency growth.
Initially, we will also treat the nfxa ratio (i.e. NFXAt=MOt) as a fully autonomous policy
decision of the central bank, which is in line with the approach taken by Holub (2001b) and
Ize (2005). This in general implies that the central bank needs to intervene in the foreign
exchange markets automatically to keep the nfxa ratio at a constant level. This assumption
greatly simpliﬁes the ﬁrst exposition of the problem, as it allows us to treat core proﬁts as a
constant. The assumption is, however, not very realistic for most cases, and we relax it later on.
3.5.1 Constant Ratio of Net Foreign Exchange Assets
With this assumption, inequality (3.25) can be illustrated in a simple phase diagram, in which
the ratio of central bank capital to currency at time t is put on the horizontal axis and the same
ratio at time t+1 is shown on the vertical axis. Inequality (3.25) is the shaded region below the
straight red solid line with a slope of (1 + it)=(1 + ¹t) and an intercept given by core proﬁts.
Based on (3.25), we can differentiate between four cases:
² 1a) currency growth exceeds the nominal interest rate (or equivalently, real currency
growth exceeds the real interest rate); “core proﬁts” are positive.
11 Ize (2005) derives his model in continuous time and in a log-linearised form, which leads to some minor differ-
ences compared with our expressions derived in discrete time.14 Martin Cincibuch, Tom´ aˇ s Holub, Jarom´ ır Hurn´ ık
Figure 3.1: Phase Diagram of the Central Bank’s “Capital Ratio”
² 1b) currency growth exceeds the nominal interest rate; core proﬁts are negative.
² 2a) currency growth is below the nominal interest rate; core proﬁts are positive.
² 2b) currency growth is below the nominal interest rate; core proﬁts are negative.
These cases are illustrated in the corresponding panels in Figure 3.1, which also include the
dashed 45-degree lines representing steady-state points.
In cases 1a and 1b the capital ratio exhibits stable dynamics. The growth rate of currency
is high, which means that the relative importance of the starting level of capital gets quickly
“eroded” and the capital ratio eventually converges to a steady-state level (OWN=M0)1a or
(OWN=M0)1b, respectively. This is the maximum level that the capital ratio can achieve in
the steady state; lower levels than that can of course be achieved by paying dividends to the
government. With positive core proﬁts, i.e. in case 1a, the steady-state level of capital is
positive, implying no ﬁnancial problems for the central bank12. With negative core proﬁts,
i.e. in case 1b, the situation is much more difﬁcult. The central bank creates losses, which
grow over time until the steady-state level of the negative capital ratio is reached. Moreover, a
capital transfer to such a loss-making central bank is not a long-run solution, as the fast currency
growth tends to decrease the ratio of capital to currency, and thus shifts the central bank back
into losses towards the same negative steady-state level of capital.13 Even with a negative level
12 Problems could emerge, however, if a negative starting level of central bank capital caused distrust in the cur-
rency and thus led to a decline in the currency growth rate or to an increase in interest rates due to a rising risk
premium. The situation could then change to case 2a (or even 2b). If the negative net capital of the central bank
was below (OWN=M0)2a at that moment, the capital deﬁcit would start to grow at an explosive pace. This would
validate the initial distrust in the currency, creating scope for self-fulﬁlling problems.
13 Stella(1997)writesthat“recapitalizationbecomesnecessarywhenlossesturnchronic”, buthealsoaddsthat“re-
capitalization makes sense only when government is committed to adopting other necessary supporting reforms”.Central Bank Losses and Economic Convergence 15
of capital (OWN=M0)1b the central bank can function, but there is at least a theoretical danger
of a self-fulﬁlling credibility crisis with a switch to case 2b. A ﬁnancial collapse of the central
bank would follow, or the central bank would have to abandon some of its policy goals. The
only permanent solution is to make changes that shift central bank core proﬁts into positive
territory, i.e. to shift the situation to case 1a.
Ize (2005) disregards cases 1a and 1b as unrealistic in the long run, arguing that a dynamically
efﬁcient economy requires real interest rates above the GDP growth rate, which is likely to
exceed the real growth rate of currency in circulation in the modern times of expanding elec-
tronic money. In other words, an inequality (i ¡ ¼) > g > (¹ ¡ ¼) is assumed, where g is the
real GDP growth rate. While this should be the case in the very long run, i.e. in the ultimate
steady state of an economy, along the convergence path of a catching-up economy this need not
hold. In a converging small open economy, the equilibrium real interest rate implied by the UIP
condition is equal to the equilibrium foreign real interest rate minus the real appreciation trend
plus the risk premium (3.18), i.e. to (i¤ ¡ ¼¤ + ¢q + '). Even if the foreign real interest rate
exceeds the foreign economic growth rate, the domestic real interest rate may be smaller than
the foreign one if the risk premium is sufﬁciently small and real appreciation relatively fast.
Moreover, GDP growth is faster in a converging economy, making the inequality less likely to
hold. Finally, the monetisation of the economy may be growing during a convergence process,
in many cases supported by progress with disinﬂation, and with it currency growth may exceed
the GDP growth rate. Putting all this together, an inverse inequality (i¡¼) < g < (¹¡¼) may
actually hold for a relatively long period of time during the convergence process.
Proceeding to the other two cases, 2a and 2b, the capital ratio exhibits explosive dynamics.
Interest rates are higher than currency growth, which means that the central bank proﬁts/losses
are more than sufﬁcient to create additional positive/negative capital to cover the newly issued
currency. This implies that the deviations of the capital ratio from its steady-state levels tend
to magnify themselves over time. More precisely, this is true only for downward deviations, as
higher-than-steady-state capital ratios can easily be solved by paying dividends to the govern-
ment. Case 2a with positive core proﬁts can be regarded as the standard proﬁt-making central
bank situation. The central bank can permanently maintain any capital ratio above a certain
negative threshold level (OWN=M0)2a. A problem arises only if a shock shifts the central
bank capital below (OWN=M0)2a. Then the situation becomes unstable. A recapitalisation of
the central bank would be a permanent solution in this case, though.
With negative core proﬁts, i.e. in case 2b, the critical level of capital is positive. The cen-
tral bank generates core losses, which must be compensated by earnings on its own capital14.
Otherwise, the losses start growing, the capital declines and eventually the central bank ﬁnan-
cially collapses, or is forced to give up its policy goals. The own capital thus must be above
(OWN=M0)2b in this situation. An alternative, of course, is to reduce the central bank’s costs
in some way in order to achieve positive core proﬁts and move to situation 2a.
The steady-state values of the capital ratio can be expressed from equation (3.24) as
own =
i ¡ 'nfxa ¡ ol
¹ ¡ i
(3.26)
In this case, “supporting reforms” can be interpreted as changes that shift the central bank to case 1a by raising its
revenues or cutting its costs (e.g. avoiding quasi-ﬁscal operations and reducing the nfxa ratio over time in favour
of domestic currency assets). Such a comprehensive recapitalisation would, of course, solve the problem.
14 In this situation, the central bank in fact functions as a foundation that needs enough starting capital to receive
sufﬁcient interest earnings to cover its inherently loss-making activities.16 Martin Cincibuch, Tom´ aˇ s Holub, Jarom´ ır Hurn´ ık
where i = i¤ ¡ ¼¤ + ¢q + ' + ¼ and where own denotes the capital ratio, nfxa the ratio of
net foreign exchange assets to currency, and ol the ratio of operating outlays to currency. This
expression is equivalent to the concept of core capital in Ize (2005). It allows us to calculate in a
closed form the capital ratio to which the central bank will be converging, given the exogenous
factors and policy parameters.
3.5.2 Variable Ratio of Net Foreign Exchange Assets
Letusnowdroptheassumptionthatthenfxaratioisafullyautonomouspolicyvariable. Instead,
we will start treating it as a path-dependent variable with its own endogenous dynamics. The
endogenous dynamics may not always be resisted with central bank interventions, but may
sometimes even be welcome if they help to achieve a desirable balance-sheet adjustment. In this
regard, a key distinction that we are going to make is whether the balance-sheet adjustment can
be achieved in a passive manner, i.e. with zero sales or purchases of foreign exchange reserves
(INTt = 0), or whether an active adjustment of the balance sheet is needed. To answer this,
we can use equation (3.9), describing the development of net foreign exchange assets over time,





















For the passive adjustment scenario, the second term on the right-hand side is equal to zero.
The development of the nfxa ratio over time then depends only on the relationship between the
local currency return on foreign exchange assets and the currency growth rate. If the former
is smaller than the latter, the nfxa ratio is going to decline over time and eventually converge
towards zero. In other words, the relatively fast currency growth rate combined with relatively
low earnings on foreign exchange assets is going to erode the importance of foreign exchange
assets in the central bank’s balance sheet. As a result, the source of central bank losses will
disappear.
Note that the above condition will hold with certainty if there is a positive risk premium (which
is the case we are interested in) and domestic interest rates are lower than the currency growth
rate, as the inequality
y
¤ = (i ¡ ') < i < ¹ (3.28)
must hold in such a situation. In this optimistic case, the losses stemming from the risk pre-
mium in combination with a high nfxa ratio are thus a self-correcting problem under a passive
adjustment scenario with relatively fast currency growth. Case 1b from Figure 3.1 eventually
turns into case 1a.
A much less favourable situation would emerge if
i > y
¤ = (i ¡ ') > ¹: (3.29)
In such a case the nfxa ratio would grow without limits and the passive adjustment scenario
would not be plausible.Central Bank Losses and Economic Convergence 17
4. The CNB’s Balance Sheet: From Deep Losses to Future Proﬁtability
The CNB may serve well as an instructive example of a central bank in a converging economy.
It started with a low initial level of foreign exchange reserves and chose the ﬁxed exchange rate
as a nominal anchor for the economy at the beginning of the economic transition. A period of
extensive foreign exchange reserves accumulation followed due to an inﬂow of foreign invest-
ment. Finally, the exchange rate is now freely ﬂoating and the nominal exchange rate has been
appreciating due to the real convergence process and the disinﬂation achieved.15
After the split of Czechoslovakia into the Czech and Slovak Republics on January 1, 1993
the initial level of the CNB’s foreign exchange reserves was low at around 697 million euro.
However, there was a steady rise in foreign exchange reserves in the subsequent years, both in
absolute terms and relative to currency in circulation, as is well documented by Table 4.1. This
increase in reserves reﬂected foreign capital inﬂows in combination with the monetary policy
regime applied by the CNB.
The newly established CNB followed the de-facto ﬁxed exchange rate regime that had been
introduced by the State Bank of Czechoslovakia in 1990. Ofﬁcially, the CNB also followed
monetary aggregate targeting, with publicly revealed money growth targets. Although the ex-
change rate ﬂuctuation band was rather narrow, at §0:5%, the CNB initially had little difﬁculty
sterilising the effects of capital inﬂows to meet both the exchange rate and monetary targets.
Table 4.1: The CNB’s Foreign Exchange Reserves (yearly averages in millions)
CZK Euro ratio to currency
1993 65 462 1 930 1.17
1994 147 858 4 331 1.74
1995 269 092 7 840 2.54
1996 352 217 10 364 2.74
1997 350 250 9 727 2.55
1998 365 667 10 149 2.59
1999 424 683 11 518 2.65
2000 489 532 13 788 2.61
2001 511 725 15 092 2.62
2002 632 779 20 601 3.00
2003 708 712 22 225 3.03
2004 690 005 21 630 2.70
2005 696 780 23 402 2.53
2006 683 887 24 191 2.26
2007 652 158 23 511 1.94
Source: CNB
The inconsistency of the ﬁxed exchange rate and monetary targets became more evident from
1994 onwards. The ongoing privatisation of the economy, the liberalisation of foreign capital
15 The CNB is also an instructive example due to its transparent accounting practices, in particular the marking-to-
market of its foreign exchange reserves. This means that the costs associated with its foreign exchange reserves
are openly revealed in its books. At the same time, the CNB is allowed to retain its proﬁts until its accumulated
loss is fully repaid. The institutional set-up is thus in line with the assumptions that were used in the theoretical
model. For countries with different accounting practices and institutional arrangements, one would of course need
to modify the framework accordingly.18 Martin Cincibuch, Tom´ aˇ s Holub, Jarom´ ır Hurn´ ık
ﬂows and the high domestic return on capital started to attract more and more foreign capital. In
order to avoid nominal exchange rate appreciation the CNB was forced to purchase the inﬂow-
ing capital and at the same time to sterilise the liquidity issued in order to avoid high monetary
aggregate growth. This resulted in a rather quick rise in the foreign exchange reserves in 1995
and 1996, and at the same time in fast money supply growth exceeding the targets.
It can be seen from Table 4.1 that roughly half of the current foreign exchange reserves were
accumulated under the ﬁxed exchange rate regime that was in place until May 1997. Then
the ﬁxed exchange rate regime was abandoned and the exchange rate started to ﬂoat. Table 4.1,
however, also revealsthatasubstantialpartoftheforeignreserveshasbeenacquired since1997.
This partly reﬂects three episodes of foreign exchange interventions in 1998, late-1999/early-
2000 and 2001–2002, when the CNB was ﬁghting strong appreciation tendencies, and partly
also purchases of governmental privatisation revenues, again in order to avoid a rapid and strong
appreciation of the currency.16
As a result, the CNB’s balance sheet gradually evolved into the situation illustrated in Figure
4.1. The asset side is dominated by foreign exchange reserves, the volume of which is more than
double that of currency in circulation. On the liability side, the main item besides currency in
circulation is sterilisation of excess liquidity, i.e. CZK-denominated interest-bearing liabilities
to the domestic banking sector, while the foreign exchange liabilities are quite small. The
CNB’s own capital is negative at almost 50% of the currency issued, due to the losses incurred
by the CNB in recent years. The emergence of these losses is explained in the next subsection.
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4.1 A Brief History of the Losses
Although a low-inﬂation environment had already been established by the ﬁxed exchange rate
regime at the beginning of the 1990s, Czech inﬂation can be viewed as having been low and rel-
16 It is interesting to note that as its crucial part the CNB’s agreement with the government on purchases of pri-
vatisation revenues included government participation in the expected sterilisation costs incurred by the CNB.
This measure was taken to limit the negative consequences of further foreign exchange reserves accumulation on
the CNB’s ﬁnancial performance. With the beneﬁt of hindsight, however, the fees negotiated were insufﬁcient to
fully cover the CNB’s costs associated with these purchases Earnings on the foreign exchange reserves naturally
contributed to their accumulation as well, before the CNB started to sell a portion of these earnings in 2004.Central Bank Losses and Economic Convergence 19
atively stable only since 1999. Subsequently, the appreciation of the real exchange rate caused
by the convergence process has proceeded mainly via appreciation of the nominal exchange
rate, hitting the CNB’s balance sheet substantially. Given the marking-to-market of the foreign
exchange reserves, the main reason for the CNB’s losses is nominal appreciation. This was
combined with quasi-ﬁscal losses in the second half of 1990s related to banking sector rescue
operations.
The period of persistent revaluation of the foreign exchange reserves begins in 2000. Table 4.2
captures the CNB’s ﬁnancing over the whole period in detail.17 Although Table 4.2 shows that
Table 4.2: CNB Proﬁts/Losses from Selected Operations (in CZK billion)
Asset Monetary Policy Quasi Fiscal Total
Revaluation and Operations Proﬁts/Losses
Proﬁts/Losses Foreign Reserves Proﬁts/Losses
Management
Proﬁts/Losses
1993 -1.86 0.38 0.0 -1.48
1994 1.54 -4.04 -2.88 -5.38
1995 1.00 7.3 -3.60 4.7
1996 -8.34 2.1 -1.45 -7.69
1997 44.65 0.79 -35.69 9.75
1998 -35.61 -6.39 -26.10 -68.1
1999 31.52 0.42 1.69 33.63
2000 -3.52 7.88 -1.58 2.78
2001 -40.12 12.7 1.05 -26.37
2002 -26.15 11.38 0.57 -14.2
2003 -29.77 12.84 0.76 -16.17
2004 -61.14 8.16 0.88 -52.1
2005 8.73 10.91 1.19 19.96
2006 -66.99 10.12 1.34 -56.39
2007 -47.67 13.97 0.02 -37.50
Source: CNB
the CNB faced revaluation losses also in 1993, 1996 and 1998, they were offset by gains in the
preceding or subsequent years and hence they did not exhibit a systematic pattern. This is the
caseonlyfrom2000onwards, whenthenominalexchangeratestartedtoappreciatepersistently.
The year 2005 should be viewed as rather exceptional and compensating for the previous year
2004, when the loss was quite enormous due to strong nominal exchange rate appreciation. In
addition, Table 4.2 provides evidence that the positive net gains arising from monetary policy
implementation and foreign exchange reserves management have been able to compensate for
the revaluation losses only partially.
The persistent revaluation losses naturally raise the question of the sustainability of the accu-
mulated central bank loss. It is hard to expect that even a central bank can accumulate a loss
indeﬁnitely. Therefore, it is important to have tools for an empirical analysis of the central
17 It is worth mentioning that Table 4.2 does not capture the CNB’s ﬁnancing completely. In fact, certain transac-
tions with the government, operating costs and other items are omitted. For a complete and precise description of
the CNB’s ﬁnancing, see the CNB’s Financial Reports (available on the CNB website).20 Martin Cincibuch, Tom´ aˇ s Holub, Jarom´ ır Hurn´ ık
bank’s balance-sheet sustainability along the convergence path. The theoretical framework de-
rived in section 3 is suitable for such an analysis. To illustrate this, we apply the framework
to the CNB’s case. We ﬁrst provide an analytical exposition of its balance-sheet sustainabil-
ity along the lines presented in subsections 3.4 and 3.5, and then move to simulation exercises
based on subsections 3.1 to 3.3. We believe that such an analysis could be applied to many
central banks in transition and emerging market economies, even though one has to keep in
mind country speciﬁcs in terms of economic development, central bank accounting practices
and institutional set-up.
4.2 The CNB’s Balance-Sheet Sustainability – Comparative-Static Exposition
In this section, we analyse the prospective dynamics of the CNB’s capital ratio as suggested
in subsections 3.4 and 3.5. To do this, we take the exogenous factors from the CNB’s forecast
(produced in October 2007), set the policy variables to their current values and assume long-
run nominal currency growth equal to nominal GDP growth. Those values include an inﬂation
target of 3% (to be lowered to 2% in 2010), a foreign equilibrium real interest rate of 1.8%, an
equilibrium real exchange rate appreciation of 3.3%, a risk premium of 2.3%, an nfxa ratio of
2.00, an operating outlays ratio of 0.7% and a nominal currency growth rate of 8% (3% inﬂation
plus 5% real growth).
With these assumptions, the CNB currently ﬁnds itself in situation 1b described in subsection
3.5 (see Figure 3.1). The corresponding steady-state capital ratio is -0.36. This means that if
nothing changes, the accumulated loss in the CNB’s balance sheet would eventually be smaller
than it is now relative to currency in circulation, but would remain negative. The factor that
would prevent the loss from increasing explosively would be fast currency growth exceeding
the assumed equilibrium nominal interest rate (equal to 3.8%).
The results are quite sensitive to the assumed values of the key parameters and policy variables.
Forexample, shouldtheriskpremiumbeonepercentagepointhigherthanassumedandallother
things remain unchanged, which is certainly not unrealistic given the past estimated values of
the risk premium, the negative steady-state capital ratio would widen to -0.78, which exceeds
the current level noticeably. Moreover, the announced reduction of the inﬂation target to 2%,
all other things being the same as in the baseline scenario, also worsens the steady-state capital
ratio to -0.60. Finally, if the nominal currency growth rate fell to 5%, perhaps due to a lower
potential real GDP growth rate, which is quite likely in of the longer run, the negative steady-
state capital ratio would deepen further to -1.14 with the new inﬂation target. In any case, these
calculations do not paint a bright picture for the CNB.
Fortunately, though, the relevant parameters and variables are unlikely to stay at their current
values forever. Focusing ﬁrst on exogenous parameters, the CNB’s forecasts assume that both
the risk premium and the real exchange rate appreciation should be falling over time, towards
0% and 1% respectively. Such a change would improve the CNB’s core proﬁts to roughly 3.1%
of currency in circulation (2.1% for the new inﬂation target), shifting it to case 1a from Figure
3.1. The steady-state capital ratio would reach +0.74 under these assumptions (0.50 with the
lowered inﬂation target; 0.95 with the lower inﬂation target and 5% nominal currency growth).
In Figure 4.2 we plot the combinations of the risk premium and real exchange rate appreciation
that would lead to zero core proﬁts of the CNB, given the current policy parameters (with the
3% inﬂation target) and would thus gradually bring the capital ratio towards zero. The CNB’s
current situation lies above the zero proﬁt line, which means that the core proﬁts of the CNB
are negative. It can be seen that with the current estimated level of the risk premium (2.3%),Central Bank Losses and Economic Convergence 21
the equilibrium real exchange rate appreciation would have to fall to 1.8% a year to assure zero
core proﬁts. Or with the current pace of real appreciation (3.3%) the risk premium would have
to decline to 0.8%. The long-run assumptions of the forecast for the future imply, however, that
the CNB will shift to positive core proﬁt territory.




























































Another two margins of adjustment of core proﬁts are the policy variables, i.e. the inﬂation
target and the nfxa ratio. An increase in the inﬂation target and/or a reduction in the nfxa
ratio would push the zero proﬁt line in Figure 4.2 in the north-east direction. If the change was
sufﬁciently strong, zero core proﬁts could be reached even with the current exogenous variables.
In Figure 4.3 we thus plot the combinations of the two policy variables that would lead to zero
core proﬁts for the current estimated risk premium (2.3%) and real equilibrium exchange rate
appreciation (3.3%).18 It can be seen that with the current nfxa ratio, the inﬂation target would
have to be 4.5% to assure zero core proﬁts. This contrasts with the existing 3% target (and even
more so with the 2% target from January 2010). To make the 3% target sustainable with the
current exogenous variables, the nfxa ratio would have to fall to 1.35 (0.91 for the new inﬂation
target), i.e. by about 33% compared to its current level.
Such a change of the balance-sheet structure is hardly achievable in the short term. It would
require massive sales of the CNB’s foreign exchange reserves, most probably contributing to a
huge exchange-rate appreciation, which would be in conﬂict with the CNB’s policy goals and
would, moreover, deepen the accumulated loss of the CNB even further by fostering exchange
rate appreciation.
18 Ize (2005) calculates the “core rate of inﬂation as the threshold rate of inﬂation that ensures zero core proﬁtabil-
ity”. Such an approach has a shortcoming, though. It implicitly assumes that the inﬂation target is the only policy
margin of adjustment, or that it is the ﬁrst one to be used. However, as Ize (2005) shows, the core rate of inﬂation
is a function of the nfxa ratio, i.e. another policy variable that can be inﬂuenced by central bank decisions. It is
realistic to assume that most central banks would prefer to adjust their balance-sheet structures to achieve zero
core proﬁts before giving up their inﬂation goals. The two policy margins should thus be treated at least as equally
important.22 Martin Cincibuch, Tom´ aˇ s Holub, Jarom´ ır Hurn´ ık


























In this paper, however, we are concerned mainly with the long-run sustainability of the central
bank’s balance sheet, and a balance-sheet adjustment may well be achievable in the long run.
This is true especially in those cases where the starting nfxa ratio does not reﬂect true policy
preferences such as maintaining international liquidity, but is rather a by-product of the past
exchange rate regime or intervention decisions. We believe that this is the CNB’s case. At the
same time, the CNB’s case is characterised by the optimistic scenario (3.28). The baseline of the
CNB forecast (which includes the new 2% inﬂation target as a steady-state assumption) together
with the assumptions about currency growth imply that the nfxa ratio is going to decline below




While the exposition of the CNB’s accumulated loss dynamics provided in the previous subsec-
tion was based on a closed-form solution and allowed useful comparative-static exercises, it has
its important limitations, too. In reality, most of the relevant variables (i.e. the risk premium,
the equilibrium real exchange rate appreciation, the nfxa ratio, etc.) are likely to change over
time simultaneously, which is hard to capture using the comparative-static approach. Moreover,
the transitory dynamics, and not just the steady-state values captured by the analytical solution,
are likely to be of interest to policy makers, too.
To overcome these shortcomings, the present section provides numerical simulations of the
central bank’s accumulated loss, using the model developed in subsections 3.1 to 3.3 and taking
the CNB as an example. In order to test the robustness of our model we start with an out-of-
sample historical forecast, before proceeding to the future forecast based on the recent situation
and macroeconomic outlook.
To check the validity of our framework, we compare its predictions with the actual CNB
balance-sheet developments. We take the actual balance sheet at a particular past date andCentral Bank Losses and Economic Convergence 23
conduct the model projection using the ex-post known development of the koruna exchange
rate, local and foreign interest rates, gross domestic product, the consumer price level, the ac-
tual foreign exchange operations pursued by CNB on its own account, and the CNB’s actual
operating outlays.
Figure 4.4: The CNB’s Actual Own Capital and Historical Projection

























Figures (4.4) and (4.5) show that the projections follow the actual development quite closely.
This corroborates that the model is internally consistent and has captured the most important
factors affecting the CNB balance sheet. It shows that the balance sheet of the central bank may
indeed be driven mainly by macroeconomic factors over which it can have no or very limited
control.
Although the actual dynamics of the explanatory factors listed above were utilised, the very
goodﬁtoftheCNBowncapitalprojectioninFigure(4.4)isnotnecessarilyautomatic. Consider
for example the projected and actual dynamics of net foreign exchange assets. While the model
assumes that their yield is mechanically determined by the respective one-year interest rate
swap rates, the actual duration or credit risk proﬁle of the foreign exchange reserves portfolio,
or active foreign exchange rate management thereof, may lead to higher or lower earnings. The
correspondence between the projection and reality conﬁrms that the foreign exchange assets
were invested in a rather conservative manner in the past. The good ﬁt also depends on the fact
that the growth rates of M0 are modelled relatively precisely and that the bulk of the CNB’s net
local currency liabilities are remunerated at the monetary policy interest rate.19
4.4 Simulation into the Future
In order to use the model for simulating the future development of the central bank’s balance
sheet, one needs to make assumptions regarding the key macroeconomic variables. Importantly,
19 For example that ﬁxed assets or gold represent a very small proportion of total local currency liabilities.24 Martin Cincibuch, Tom´ aˇ s Holub, Jarom´ ır Hurn´ ık
Figure 4.5: The CNB’s Actual Net Foreign Exchange Assets and Historical Projection

























those assumptions should be internally consistent and should reﬂect some basic consensus con-
cerning the long-run trends of the economy.
To fulﬁl the above requirements, the modelling of the balance sheet is based on the CNB’s
macroeconomic forecast as published in the CNB’s Inﬂation Report. The CNB’s forecast splits
into two parts: business cycle ﬂuctuations and underlying long-run trends. The business cycle
is simulated using the CNB Quarterly Projection Model20, and the long-run trends are chosen
consistently with the model assumptions. For our long-term projection, the trends and equi-
librium values underlying the forecast are, of course, more important than the business cycle
dynamics.
Figure 4.6 depicts the projection based on the initial condition for the CNB’s own capital in
the ﬁrst quarter of 2007 using the macroeconomic forecast from the fourth quarter of 2007,
consistently with subsection 4.2. The long-run trends assumed in this CNB forecast were al-
ready mentioned in subsection 4.2. Long-run inﬂation is equal to the inﬂation target of 3% (2%
with the new inﬂation target). This, together with the assumption of long-run potential output
growth of 5% (assumed to decline gradually towards 3% in the simulations), governs nominal
GDP growth, which is of primary importance for the expected growth of households’ cash hold-
ings. The ratio of cash holdings to nominal GDP (monetisation) has been growing in the Czech
economy since 1993, and is about 9.5% of annual nominal GDP at present. The growth rate of
cash holdings is currently roughly 10%, close to the average growth rate of 10.5% in the period
from July 2002 to January 2007.
In order to model cash holdings properly one should of course also apply the elasticity of money
demand to the nominal interest rate. In reality, however, the ratio of cash holdings depends on
20 See Beneˇ s, V´ avra and Vlˇ cek (2002) for a detailed description.Central Bank Losses and Economic Convergence 25
Figure 4.6: Future Simulation of the CNB’s Own Capital

























interest rates only marginally, as estimated by Hanousek and T˚ uma (1995), and it is unlikely that
the level of monetisation will grow further in the future. As a result, the level of monetisation
remains roughly the same in our baseline simulation, causing the growth of cash holdings to
converge towards the growth of nominal GDP.
The foreign equilibrium real interest rate is assumed to be currently around 1.8%. In addition,
we assume that the foreign equilibrium interest rate will rise gradually towards 2%. In particu-
lar we deal with the US and Eurozone interest rates, as the CNB holds both the US dollar and
the euro as its main reserve currencies. Long-run inﬂation is assumed to be 2% for both the
Eurozone and the US. The risk premium is assumed to decline over time towards 0%. Finally,
the current value of the trend real exchange rate appreciation is assumed to decline gradually
towards 1%, reﬂecting the expected convergence slowdown. The real exchange rate apprecia-
tion in accordance with the assumed inﬂation differential consequently determines the expected
path of the nominal exchange rate.
We assume that the foreign exchange reserves are invested in the euro or dollar money market
with a one-year maturity. Future returns on these reserves are modelled using implied forward
rates adjusted for the term premium. The term premium is positively related to the forward
horizon, but the relationship is less than proportional. It was calibrated in such a way that
at very long horizons the projected future one-year maturity rate coincides with the assumed
equilibrium interest rate.
We assume that the return on the foreign exchange reserves is relatively conservative and that
in reality it is possible to perform better. In fact, the actual duration of the CNB’s portfolios is
higher than one year. We also assume, in line with the current policy, that the CNB will sell
the foreign currency interest (coupons) earned on its reserves in return for koruna. However, no
other foreign exchange operations are taken into account in the simulation.26 Martin Cincibuch, Tom´ aˇ s Holub, Jarom´ ır Hurn´ ık
Table 4.3: CNB Balance-sheet Projections Based on the CNB’s Macroeconomic Forecast
from Q4 2007 (in CZK billion)
OWN NFXA M0 NIBL OL(flow p:a:)
2007 -148 650 326 472 1.9
2009 -154 630 370 415 2.1
2011 -161 605 455 310 2.2
2013 -155 581 542 195 2.3
2015 -140 562 625 77 2.4
2017 -115 549 704 -40 2.5
2019 -83 537 793 -173 2.6
2021 -43 526 890 -321 2.7
2023 5 516 993 -482 2.8
2030 245 480 1423 -1188 3.2
Source: Own calculations.
Figure 4.7: Phase Diagram of the Projected CNB Own Capital Ratio
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We further assume that the CNB neither pays dividends to the state budget nor receives any
government support. Therefore, we assume that DIV = 0.
It follows from Figure 4.6 that the period of losses is not fully over yet. The baseline scenario
predicts that the own capital becomes initially even more negative. Table 4.3 shows that despite
the continued fast growth of cash holdings the central bank will remain a net borrower in the
domestic currency for the next 10–11 years, which implies related costs for monetary policy
conduct. The nominal GDP expansion, however, will lead to growth of the unremunerated
liabilities represented by currency in circulation at the expense of costly sterilisations. This,
together with the return on the foreign exchange reserves, becomes sufﬁcient to eliminate the
losses almost entirely at the horizon of seven years. The negative own capital then stops rising
and later on starts to decline. The return of own capital to positive values becomes fast as soon
as the growth of cash holdings eliminates the need to sterilise liquidity and the CNB becomes a
net creditor in the domestic currency.Central Bank Losses and Economic Convergence 27
Figure 4.8: Phase Diagram of the Projected CNB’s nfxa Ratio
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proﬁts in the baseline scenario. Time is on the CNB’s side, and growth of currency in circulation
does the trick. First, the liability side of the balance sheet becomes dominated by currency and
at some moment in time the central bank may stop the costly withdrawal of liquidity from the
banking sector altogether and start to provide liquidity to it. From this moment, the asset side
also becomes more favourable. At the beginning the bulk of the assets were in foreign low-
yielding currency, whereas with liquidity provisioning the asset composition will tilt towards
the local currency.
Furthermore, it might be reasonable to expect, in line with the simulation’s underlying assump-
tions, thatthe appreciation ofthe real exchangewill declineand will bea smallerdrag on proﬁts.
Moreover, the declining NIBL will limit the negative inﬂuence of the declining, but still pos-
itive risk premium. Finally, once NIBL turns negative the remaining risk premium will even
support proﬁtability. Thus, currency growth and the gradually dying out of the real exchange
rate appreciation are the forces behind the return of own capital towards the positive values. As
these factors are quite likely to happen in the future, similarly the accumulated loss is likely to
be paid off.
One of course needs to keep in mind the importance of the underlying assumptions that lead
to the repayment of the losses in the future. For some macroeconomic scenarios, the passive
adjustment mechanism may not be viable. In subsection 4.2 we analysed in a comparative-static
setting which values of the exogenous and policy variables would keep the central bank in core
losses and thus prevent the future repayment of its current negative own capital. Similarly, one
can run alternative or stress-test simulations to see if a particular mix of assumptions puts the
central bank’s balance sheet on a sustainable path.
We chose to illustrate this potential of the derived framework on a variable which did not re-
ceive so much attention in the comparative-static discussion of subsection 4.2, i.e. the nominal
currency growth rate. In ﬁgure (4.6) above, we present an alternative simulation based on the
assumption that the monetisation will gradually decline to 7% of annual nominal GDP, instead
of remaining constant as in the baseline scenario. It turns out that although quantitatively im-28 Martin Cincibuch, Tom´ aˇ s Holub, Jarom´ ır Hurn´ ık
portant, the assumption of persistently high monetisation is not crucial for the result that the
CNB should be able to generate enough future proﬁts to reverse its negative own capital if the
other assumptions of the baseline scenario remain unchanged. Signiﬁcantly slower growth of
cash holdings delays repayment of the accumulated loss by about 5 years, but does not change
the position in a qualitative manner.
5. The Balance Sheet and Euro Adoption
Euro area membership would mean a signiﬁcant change for the central bank balance sheet of
a new member state. There are both economic and institutional reasons for this. Let us ﬁrst




't ceases to play a role for a union member. The euro will become its home currency and its
remaining foreign exchange reserves will be held in dollars or in other world currencies. It
seems to be a fair working assumption that the predictable excess returns for such currencies
with respect to the euro will average to zero over the long run.












where we denote by the accent the country’s variables under the monetary union regime. For
example, i0
t is the interest rate prevailing in the euro area after the entry of the new member
state.
Without the risk premium, the proﬁts of the central bank of a converging economy would not
be depressed by those losses on the foreign exchange reserves. Yet in the context of the dual
role of the risk premium in equation (3.21), one also needs to consider whether the interest rate
under the euro will be higher or lower than in the other case.
If the new member state is small then i0
t ¼ i¤
t, the interest rate in the union without the new
entrant. Under this assumption, equation (3.18) shows two opposing factors that determine
interest rates under euro area membership in comparison with the case of an independent cur-
rency. On the one hand, they will not contain the respective risk premium. But on the other
hand, they will no longer be restricted by the inﬂation-targets-adjusted real appreciation.
The actual balance of these two factors is country speciﬁc. Traditionally, it has been assumed
that new member states would beneﬁt from the low inﬂation and credibility of the monetary
union and therefore would enjoy lower interest rates after entry. However, this does not hold
universally. For example, Czech interest rates have long been slightly below those in the euro
area, because the real appreciation and relatively low inﬂation targets have outweighed the
Czech risk premium. Therefore for the Czech case, we may conclude that interest rates in the
euro adoption scenario would be marginally higher than otherwise.
Assuming M00
t + OWN0
t > 0, the higher interest rates may affect proﬁtability in two ways.
They directly increase the return on the currency stock and own capital in (5.30), but they
also negatively affect the demand for narrow money balances, as illustrated by (3.4) and (3.5).
However, for small changes and low inﬂation levels the positive direct effect will be stronger.Central Bank Losses and Economic Convergence 29
Further, consider inﬂation and its inﬂuence on the currency stock. In general, whether inﬂation
in a country is higher under euro area membership or with an independent monetary policy is
again a country-speciﬁc matter. However, if the new member state has achieved low inﬂation
and at the same time faces a real appreciation trend, inﬂation is very likely to increase after
euro adoption. This is because euro area entry will not stop the real appreciation trend, which
is a real-economy convergence phenomenon. With the nominal exchange rate ﬁxed, the real
appreciation ¢q0
t < 0 will exclusively take the form of an inﬂation differential. In the Czech
Republic, the inﬂation target of the independent Czech monetary policy has been set at 2% for
the time period after January 2010, i.e. very close to that of the ECB. Therefore, the inﬂation
differential vis-` a-vis the euro area average caused by the real appreciation trend would imply
higher inﬂation compared to the independent monetary policy scenario.
The higher inﬂation, ceteris paribus, means faster growth of M00
t, as the following restatement













We assume here that real output growth and the structural parameters are not signiﬁcantly af-
fected by euro area membership, therefore GDP 0
t = GDPt, c0
t = ct, and ®0
t = ®t.
Summing up, we ﬁnd that euro adoption would be unambiguously positive for the proﬁt and
loss of the CNB in the case of natural proﬁt sharing, i.e. if we ignore the redistribution of
monetary income in the euro area. This is because inﬂation will be higher, interest rates will be
higher, albeit not too much to undermine the demand for currency, and the risk premium will
not decrease the returns on the central bank’s assets.
5.2 Euro-Area-Speciﬁc Institutional Features
The above economic considerations involve a signiﬁcant simpliﬁcation. The actual proﬁt-
sharing rule in the euro area is different from the natural one assumed in (5.30). In particular,
monetary income is redistributed according to the countries’ paid-up capital shares in the ECB,
which are determined by equally weighted population and nominal GDP country shares in the
EU. Moreover, 8% of the monetary income is allocated to the ECB to ﬁnance its operations.













































The euro area proﬁt-sharing rule (5.33), which takes into account nominal GDP instead of
the currency stock, penalises countries with highly monetised economies, i.e. those with high
21 On a more detailed level of analysis, one would need to take into account that the countries’ shares in the ECB’s
capital, deﬁned in (5.33), are adjusted not continuously, but only once every ﬁve years. However, this does not
have important qualitative consequences.30 Martin Cincibuch, Tom´ aˇ s Holub, Jarom´ ır Hurn´ ık
mj in the demand for narrow money (5.31). On the other hand, because of its relation to the
population, the proﬁt-sharing rule is favourable to countries with relatively low nominal GDP
per capita.
The redistributional aspects of the proﬁt-sharing rule were ﬁrstly pointed out by Sinn and Feist
(1997), who argued that Germany, for instance, could incur signiﬁcant losses because the Ger-
man mark’s world currency role was not taken into account.22 The same aspect and its implica-
tions for the prospective new euro area entrant were discussed by Gros (2004), who concluded
that “that one would expect the new member countries to beneﬁt from participating in the dis-
tribution of the proﬁts of the ECB ... but this would not be the case for the Czech Republic,
which neither gains nor loses seigniorage income”.
In the Czech case the two factors affecting the direction of the redistribution work against each
other. While the Czech economy is highly monetised, its nominal per capita income is low
in comparison with the euro area average. The numerical evaluation shows, however, that the
ﬁrst factor is more inﬂuential. Therefore, the euro area proﬁt-sharing rules would redistribute
away from the CNB, at least in the initial period. For example, if the Czech Republic joined
the current euro area immediately, its share in the monetary income would be roughly 1.8%,
while the natural share would be around 2%. If entry came in about ﬁve years and the euro
area in the meantime expanded to 22 countries, the Czech share in monetary income would be
approximately 2%, but the natural share would at that time reach 2.2%.
Overall, the effect of euro adoption is ambiguous. While the economic factors would imply
faster repayment of the CNB’s accumulated loss, the institutional factors are likely to push
in the other direction. The actual outcome may depend on many assumptions, including the
development of monetisation both in the Czech Republic and in the euro area, the number of
countries in the euro area, etc. Some of the simulations that we carried out suggested that euro
adoption would on balance speed up the repayment of the CNB’s loss marginally, by about 2
years.23 In any case, future euro area membership does not change our conclusion that the CNB
should be able to repay its loss out of future proﬁts. Moreover, by eliminating the risk premium
almost with certainty, euro adoption eliminates a major risk of this optimistic scenario.
One should emphasise, however, that the faster and more certain repayment of the CNB’s loss
in the euro area does not necessarily mean an unambiguous increase in Czech welfare. For ex-
ample, the balance-sheet improvement partly stems from higher inﬂation, which is tantamount
to a higher inﬂation tax and perhaps more nominal uncertainty. A welfare analysis, though,
goes well beyond the scope of this paper.
6. Conclusions
Central bank losses and negative capital have become an important issue of policy debate, re-
ﬂecting the experience of numerous central banks across the world. This issue is highly relevant
to the CNB, too, given the huge accumulated loss in its balance sheet.
The source of the losses can differ substantially across countries and periods of time. While
the earlier literature focused mainly on quasi-ﬁscal operations, more recent contributions have
focused on the losses associated with high net foreign exchange reserves. The latter source
22 In practice, this aspect was partly addressed by the phasing-in of the monetary income redistribution scheme
during the ﬁrst ﬁve years of operation of the euro area.
23 These simulations are not presented here for the sake of brevity, but they are available from the authors upon
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of losses is the focal point of the present paper, reﬂecting the CNB’s experience since the
year 2000. We have shown that central bank balance sheets in converging (emerging mar-
ket) economies can be prone to systematic losses. This is especially true for countries that have
achieved disinﬂation and at the same time have to sterilise liquidity issued in the past due to
massive purchases of foreign exchange reserves. From the accounting point of view, the losses
manifest themselves as revaluation of foreign exchange reserves. From the economic point of
view, the decrease in seigniorage (monetary income) due to low nominal interest rates, com-
bined with the risk-premium-related costs of holding large net foreign exchange reserves, is
responsible for the losses.
Building on Holub (2001b), Bindseil, Manzanares and Weill (2004) and Ize (2005), our paper
provides a practical framework for assessing the ability of a central bank to remain solvent given
the current level of its own capital, the structure of its balance sheet and long-term economic
prospects. To achieve this, we have developed a more comprehensive model of the central
bank’s balance sheet and its linkages to macroeconomic trends than the earlier literature. Most
importantly, we have analysed in more depth the consequences of economic convergence for the
evolution of the central bank’s balance sheet and the important role played in this process by
the risk premium and equilibrium real exchange rate appreciation. A combination of a closed-
form comparative-static analysis and numerical solutions of the future evolution of the central
bank’s own capital has been used to expose the problem from different angles and exploit some
complementarities of the two approaches which have not been combined in earlier papers.
The present paper applies the derived framework to the CNB’s case. We show that if the risk
premium, equilibrium real exchange rate appreciation and net foreign exchange reserves ratio
remained at their current levels, the CNB would continue to record large “core losses” with its
low inﬂation targets (2% from 2010). Given the fast growth rate of currency in circulation, the
CNB’s capital ratio would converge to a steady-state negative level of roughly -60%. Moreover,
one cannot exclude even more pessimistic outcomes for plausible variations in the underlying
assumptions.
This is not, however, a realistic long-term scenario. As economic convergence progresses, the
risk premium is likely to fade away, as is the real exchange rate appreciation trend. Moreover,
the net foreign exchange reserves ratio will gradually fall if the CNB engages in no future for-
eignexchangeinterventions. Takingthelong-runtrendsfromtheCNB’sforecastsandassuming
no interventions, our simulations show that the CNB will be able to repay its current accumu-
lated loss out of future proﬁts. The most plausible scenarios suggest that the loss will take
roughly 15 years to repay. Given this prospect, we believe that the accumulated loss can be kept
in the CNB’s books without damaging monetary policy credibility and without recourse to pub-
lic budgets to cover the loss. One should always keep in mind that any such government partic-
ipation in central bank ﬁnancing could constrain the bank’s operational independence, making
such participation less attractive than the repayment strategy based on the central bank’s future
proﬁts. This strategy should be openly communicated to the public and political representatives
to address the credibility challenges arising from the central bank’s negative capital.
While the CNB’s case has many speciﬁc features and the conclusions reached in our paper may
not be directly transferable to other central banks, the derived framework itself is fairly general
and could be successfully applied to other countries’ experience. We leave this as a challenge
for future research.32 Martin Cincibuch, Tom´ aˇ s Holub, Jarom´ ır Hurn´ ık
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